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ApplicAnt FAking on personAlity 
tests: good or BAd And Why should 
We cAre?
Robert P. Tett1 and Daniel V. Simonet2
1. The University of  Tulsa
2. Montclair University
Self-report personality tests have become popular 
selection tools (Ryan et al., 2015). Shadowing empirical 
support for personality–job performance relationships 
(e.g., Hogan & Holland, 2003; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000; 
Tett et al., 1999) has been research on the susceptibility of 
self-report scales to deliberate response distortion or fak-
ing. Dozens of studies show that people can fake on per-
sonality tests and actually do fake when the stakes are high, 
as in selection settings (Birkeland et al., 2006; Levashina 
et al., 2014). An equally important but more fundamental 
question is how much does faking matter? Two main camps 
have formed around this question.
The traditional view, based on the unitarian understand-
ing of construct validity (American Educational Research 
Association, 2014; SIOP, 2018), is that faking undermines 
the validity of inferences drawn from test scores. Contrast-
ing this “faking is bad” (FIB) perspective, some authors 
have suggested that “faking is good” (FIG) in the dual 
sense that it contributes to predictor–criterion correlations, 
thereby improving validity, and identifies prospectively 
good employees.1 These two perspectives, FIB and FIG, 
are irreconcilable: Both cannot be true, and moreover, they 
point to different futures for personality assessment in the 
workplace.
Our aim in this paper is to critically examine the FIB 
and FIG positions in advancing the use of standardized 
personality tests in selection settings. Conceptual analysis 
in light of the evidence suggests the FIG approach poses a 
serious threat to self-report personality assessment for use 
in hiring. The FIB perspective warns of a similar fate but 
offers a more promising future targeting improved mea-
surement of job-relevant traits serving more effective per-
sonality-based hiring. After clarifying our assumptions and 
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ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS
The unitarian understanding of construct validity holds that deliberate response distortion in 
completing self-report personality tests (i.e., faking) threatens trait-based inferences drawn 
from test scores. This “faking-is-bad” (FIB) perspective is being challenged by an emerging 
“faking-is-good” (FIG) position that condones or favors faking and its underlying attributes 
(e.g., social skill, ATIC) to the degree they contribute to predictor–criterion correlations and 
are job relevant. Based on the unitarian model of validity and relevant empirical evidence, 
we argue the FIG perspective is psychometrically flawed and counterproductive to 
personality-based selection targeting trait-based fit. Carrying forward both positions leads 
to variously dark futures for self-report personality tests as selection tools. Projections under 
FIG, we suggest, are particularly serious. FIB offers a more optimistic future but only to the 
degree faking can be mitigated. Evidence suggesting increasing applicant faking rates and 




selection, trait-based fit 
1    A third perspective—that faking does not matter—aligns with 
the FIG approach because, like FIG, it suggests steps to reduce or 
control faking are unwarranted. Faking-is-neutral legitimizes FIG.
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dation for the FIB versus FIG debate. We then articulate the 
logic of the two perspectives in light of relevant empirical 
findings and identify key challenges to the FIG position, 
particularly with respect to validity. Finally, possible futures 
for personality tests as selection tools are identified in a 
conditional defense of the traditional FIB perspective.
Assumptions
Our arguments build on three assumptions pertaining 
to, respectively, the personality test user, the test taker, and 
the test itself. First and foremost, we assume organizations 
using personality tests in hiring are making a good-faith at-
tempt to distinguish among applicants with respect to their 
expected fit in meeting work demands. Achieving a good 
fit benefits both the organization and the worker. Operating 
from the trait perspective, trait activation theory (Tett & 
Burnett, 2003; Tett et al., 2013) suggests fit occurs where 
workers, by the traits they possess, are rewarded for being 
themselves, and organizations benefit accordingly by hav-
ing workers who are trait motivated. From a more strictly 
empirical standpoint, fit may be promoted using personality 
tests as self-presentation prediction tools (see below). Ideal-
ly, scales used in screening have been identified a priori as 
job related (SIOP, 2018), but faking is relevant to prediction 
and fit in both confirmatory and exploratory ventures. 
Second, job applicants are assumed to be motivated, to 
varying degrees, to present an overall favorable impression 
when completing a self-report personality test. A moti-
vation effect is clearly evident in meta-analyses showing 
heightened test score means (on positively valued traits) in 
applicants relative to incumbents (e.g., Jeong et al., 2017; 
Salgado, 2016), especially on job-relevant scales (Birkeland 
et al., 2006). The meaning and importance of the motiva-
tional shift are near the heart of the FIG/FIB debate, but the 
shift itself is not in question.
Third, despite the motivational shift, self-report person-
ality tests are assumed to hold potential to yield scores un-
der applicant conditions that permit prediction of important 
workplace criteria. How well they do that in particular cases 
depends on a variety of factors (Tett & Christiansen, 2007), 
but test scores are generally expected to capture individual 
differences tied to criterion variance. A key question here 
is what accounts for correlations between personality test 
scores and criterion measures. That such prediction is pos-
sible, however, is generally not up for debate.2
Faking Defined
Faking on personality tests has been defined in various 
ways (Holden & Book, 2012). Building on earlier works 
(e.g., Zickar et al., 2004), Griffith et al. (2011) identify four 
types of applicant faking.3 Fraudulent faking is deliberate 
distortion in responding to personality test items opposite 
what one believes is true about the self. This most extreme 
form of faking, Griffith et al. suggest, amounts to lying or 
cheating (see also Tett & Simonet, 2011). Exaggeration 
entails intentionally or unintentionally overstating strengths 
and understating weaknesses, identifiable in most cases 
as “slight” faking or “polishing the truth.” Applicants en-
gaged in reactive responding answer each item to make a 
favorable impression with regard not to the self but rather 
to what the applicant expects the organization will find 
desirable. Finally, deriving from socioanalytic theory (e.g., 
Johnson & Hogan, 2006; see also Marcus, 2009), self-pre-
sentation is the applicant’s attempt to respond to personality 
items so as to convey the reputation they seek to convey on 
the job.4
All four types of faking are relevant to current aims. 
The fraudulent form and, to a lesser degree, exaggeration, 
capture prototypical faking, what most faking researchers—
and, we suspect, most readers—recognize as challenging 
to reliance on self-report personality tests in promoting 
worker–job fit. Those two types of fakers are the marquis 
players from the FIB perspective, especially the fraudulent 
variety. Self-presentation is also directly relevant to current 
discussion, as its conceptual source, socioanalytic theory, is 
a foundation for the FIG perspective.
The remaining type, reactive faking, is less strategic 
than the others. Like self-presentation, it does not entail ac-
tive consideration of what is true about the self, yet it lacks 
the follow-through in projecting a similar image on the job, 
critical for prediction based on self-presentation. Reactive 
fakers are not lying as a deliberate misrepresentation of the 
perceived self, nor are they polishing the truth. Like other 
types of fakers, however, their responses to personality test 
items are keyed to what they think the test user is looking 
for in a good-fitting candidate. Reactive faking, like other 
types, thwarts the intentions of the test user and, according-
ly, exemplifies the FIB position. The case of self-presenta-
tion prompts more detailed evaluation in light of the FIG 
position, offered in a later section.5
Intentionality in faking bears further review for two 
reasons. First, it has two distinct targets. The first target is 
the degree to which responses to personality test items are 
judged in relation to the perceived self. As noted, fraudulent 
faking is a deliberate misrepresentation of the self, exag-
geration may or may not be deliberate in this respect, and 
reactive faking is definitively unintentional in this sense 
because the self is not considered. The second target of in-
2    Variability in personality–outcome linkages in applicants is dis-
cussed below. For an unusually nihilistic view of self-report person-
ality tests, see Morgeson et al. (2007).
3    Levashina and Campion (2007) offer a similar taxonomy of fak-
ing in employment interviews.
4     From a strict socioanalytic viewpoint (Johnson & Hogan, 2006), 
faking does not exist because there is no real self against which to 
judge accuracy in self-report. We adopt Griffith et al.’s perspective in 
considering self-presentation a type of faking in order to advance 
comparisons between the FIB and FIG positions.
5     Both reactive responding and self-presentation have respon-
dents choosing answers keyed to making their best impression 
regardless of the self. The former, however, may abandon impres-
sion-making on the job, whereas the latter seeks to garner the same 
reputation on the job.
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tentionality is the degree to which respondents comply with 
the good-faith intentions of the test user to identify best-fit-
ting job candidates. Reactive fakers do not deliberately 
distort responses in light of the perceived self, but they do 
choose to reject the aim of assessment, which, from a FIB 
perspective, is to identify test takers’ relative standing on 
stable propensities tied to performance and other outcomes 
in order to achieve fit. This choice may be driven by norms 
and coaching to present a favorable impression in appli-
cant settings, but it is a choice nonetheless. The deliberate 
rejection of the fundamental aim of personality assessment 
to hire best-fit workers is a critical concern from the FIB 
perspective, to which we return later in the article.
Intentionality is further relevant to faking to distinguish 
it from self-deception, the degree to which the respondent 
perceives the self as more desirable than the true self. 
Self-deception is unconscious error (Paulhus & Trapnell, 
2008) and, although problematic from a validation stand-
point, warrants separate attention (e.g., regarding defense 
mechanisms and other processes affecting accuracy in 
self-perception). We do not address self-deception further 
here, except to assert that unintentional exaggeration, noted 
above, is more closely aligned with self-deception than with 
faking. 
In light of the foregoing discussion, we adopt Griffith et 
al.’s (2011) definition of faking as “an intentional response 
behavior aimed at exerting a positive influence on the hiring 
decision” (p. 345). Notably, this definition accommodates 
both self-referenced inaccuracy and more general noncom-
pliance with the primary aim of assessment. It also serves 
current aims because it identifies the goal of faking, which 
is to respond to personality test items so as to appear well 
suited for the job regardless of one’s standing on targeted 
dimensions, and it explicitly recognizes the hiring setting, 
where motivation to fake is elevated. Faking is most rele-
vant under motivated conditions, which is why it continues 
to draw attention in selection contexts.
Validity 
Reflecting over 50 years of conceptual refinement 
(Sireci, 2009), validity is now widely accepted under a 
“unitarian” model as “the degree to which evidence and 
theory support the interpretation of test scores proposed by 
the test user” (American Educational Research Association, 
2014, p. 11), with the critical caveat that “The proposed in-
terpretation includes specifying the construct the test is in-
tended to measure.” Thus, validity is the degree to which a 
test measures what it is purported to measure (i.e., a defined 
construct). Central to the current discussion, specification 
of a targeted construct rules out a purely empirical render-
ing of validity, whereby a positive correlation between test 
X and criterion Y, by itself, permits “valid” inferences. The 
unitarian perspective requires in addition that the correla-
tion makes sense in light of the constructs targeted by those 
measures (Binning & Barrett, 1989).6
Cronbach and Meehl’s (1955) seminal contribution to 
discussions of validity was introduction of the “nomological 
network” of constructs definitive of and otherwise relating 
to what the test user understands the test to measure. Sup-
port for construct validity comes from the integration of ra-
tional argument and various sources of evidence supporting 
expectations derived from the nomological net. Cronbach 
and Meehl stated further that, “The problem faced by the 
investigator is ‘What constructs account for variance in test 
performance?’” (p. 282). That validation is about confirm-
ing construct-based inferences is imperative for discussion 
of whether faking on self-report personality tests is bad or 
good, especially in employment settings.
The “Faking Is Bad” (FIB) Perspective
The FIB camp, true to the doctrine of construct validity, 
sees faking as an unwanted source of test score variance. 
More specifically, it is differential distortion in compliance 
and/or describing the self relative to what the test taker 
truly believes, posing a direct threat to construct validity 
and prediction. Consider a test targeting conscientiousness 
(C) used to hire wedding consultants. Applicants vary in C, 
and the test, if construct valid, captures that variance, such 
that those who see themselves as conscientious score highly 
and those as lacking in that attribute score low. Because 
wedding planning requires careful attention to details on 
several fronts (e.g., scheduling, invitations, menu, budget), 
it is expected to be performed especially well by conscien-
tious people. So, to the extent the test of C supports con-
struct-valid inferences, test takers with higher scores will 
have a higher probability of success on the job.
Faking weakens targeted inferences because, when 
applicants fake good, they do so to varying degrees, there-
by adding variance beyond that attributable to the targeted 
job-relevant trait (e.g., C in the case of wedding planner). 
Sources of faking may include one or more non-targeted 
variables (e.g., ambition, Machiavellianism, general mental 
ability; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Tett et al., 2012; Tett & 
Simonet, 2011). The challenge to construct validity is that 
the nomological net for the targeted trait (C) may or may 
not include the factors underlying faking. If it does, those 
factors may be positively, negatively, or neutrally related 
to performance and other valued outcomes (Huber et al., 
2021; Komar et al., 2008; O’Connell et al., 2011). Regard-
less of whether or not faking and its attributes contribute to 
predicting those outcomes, faking as deliberate distortion or 
noncompliance undermines the inference that scores on the 
given measure represent persons’ standing on the targeted 
trait (C). That the additional, nontargeted sources of vari-
ance can play out independently of targeted sources makes 
faking, according to this perspective, something worth 
identifying, assessing, and, as far as possible, constraining.
Critical to note here is that what makes faking bad is 
6    We avoid the term “validity coefficient” typically applied to pre-
dictor-criterion correlations because a key point in our argument is 
that inferences of validity require more than mere correlation.
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not simply its attenuation of a correlation between a job-rel-
evant trait measure and a trait-relevant criterion measure. 
Such an effect is troubling, but the key issue more broadly 
is construct validity. Correlation is not by itself a sufficient 
condition for inferring a test is measuring what it is pur-
ported to assess. Faking that strengthens the correlation be-
tween a personality scale and a criterion measure is equally 
problematic from the unitarian perspective. We return to 
this important issue later on.
The “Faking-Is-Good” (FIG) Perspective
At an intuitive level, the FIG position seems straight-
forward. Hollenbeck (in Morgeson et al., 2007), for exam-
ple, claimed that “self-monitoring is probably a good thing 
in most social contexts, suggesting that whatever contrib-
utes to faking may also contribute to job performance” (p. 
708). He goes on to note that, “If you work at Disney, you 
are supposed to be having a good day every single day. 
Again, if you cannot fake a personality item, how are you 
going to work at Disney everyday, smiling at these young 
children stomping on your feet?” (p. 717). Murphy (same 
article) says:
I am more concerned about the failure to fake. Suppose 
you are in a situation where you know what you are 
supposed to do (such as giving a socially desirable or 
socially acceptable answer) and you cannot or will not 
do it. We should not be wringing our hands about fak-
ing. I think we should be thinking very seriously about 
the people who give responses that are not socially 
adaptive in a high stakes situation where they know 
what they are supposed to do. People who do not know 
when they should give honest answers and when they 
should fake might lack a skill of adaptation to a social 
world. (p. 712)
Dipboye (same article) adds, “Why not start with the real-
ity that applicants obviously will try to convey a favorable 
image of themselves in a selection situation. If they do not, 
then that is probably more of a reason for concern than if 
they do” (p. 713). 
More principled grounding for the FIG perspective de-
rives primarily from two overlapping sources: (a) socioana-
lytic theory (e.g., Hogan & Blickle, 2013), and (b) self-pre-
sentation theory (Marcus, 2009; Marcus et al., 2019). Each 
theory is described below with an emphasis on its implica-
tions regarding the value of faking.
Socioanalytic theory. Hogan and colleagues (e.g., Ho-
gan & Blickle, 2013; Hogan et al., 1996; Johnson & Hogan, 
2006) argue that people are motivated to pursue status (to 
get ahead), acceptance (to get along), and personal mean-
ing. The individual’s identity is how they want to be seen 
by others and the individual’s reputation is how others ac-
tually see them. The testing situation offers the test taker an 
opportunity to present a chosen identity. Those high on “so-
cial skill” create an impression that is consistent with their 
chosen identity. Carried over to the job, this impression 
management process yields a reputation consistent with that 
intended by the individual in responding to personality test 
items.
According to socioanalytic theory, people are always 
self-presenting how they want to be seen, whether in com-
pleting a personality test or behaving on the job. To test that 
idea, Hogan et al. (2007) compared mean personality test 
scores of rejected applicants to mean scores of the same 
applicants 6 months later under the same conditions and 
found only trivial increases. They concluded from this that 
“Our review can be summarized as ‘all faking all the time’ 
– which means that faking doesn’t matter” (p. 1280).7 
Two aspects of socioanalytic theory especially relevant 
to the FIG perspective are (a) an emphasis on empirical 
prediction over construct validity, and (b) an understanding 
of faking or the factors that serve it as job relevant. The first 
feature stems from a rejection of trait theory. Specifically, 
it is argued there is no reliably known self against which 
to judge the accuracy of self-report. Faking, accordingly, 
cannot be understood as a discrepancy between the true self 
(or even an honestly misperceived self) and one’s self-de-
scription in responses to personality test items. The term 
“validity” has special meaning in socioanalytic theory: “item 
responses are valid when respondents produce scores that 
correspond to their established social reputations, whether 
or not their responses correspond literally to actual behav-
iors and experiences in real life” (Johnson & Hogan, 2006; 
p. 214). The primary aim of any assessment, accordingly, 
is not to assess test takers’ standing on a targeted trait but 
rather to predict on-the-job reputations as evaluated by oth-
ers. Thus, empirical prediction, not construct validity, is the 
key aim of assessment.
The second feature of socioanalytic theory with partic-
ular relevance to the FIG perspective is that faking is taken 
to signal a valued test taker characteristic. Hogan and col-
leagues argue that what translates a person’s identity into 
his or her reputation is social skill. Those skilled in present-
ing a favorable reputation when completing a personality 
test will be skilled in creating a similarly favorable reputa-
tion on the job. Both test score variance and performance 
variance thus capture individual differences in social skill, 
and this is what accounts for empirical covariance between 
the personality and performance measures. Notably, social 
skill is not a trait in the stable personality sense of that term 
but rather is trainable. Of further note, social skill is rele-
vant to all jobs as every work setting offers opportunities to 
manage impressions favoring one’s reputation with respect 
to valued work behavior (e.g., performance as perceived by 
7   In contrast, Hausknecht (2010) and Landers et al. (2011) report 
sizable increases in personality test scores on retest under applicant 
conditions. Walmsley and Sackett (2013) suggest Hogan et al.’s null 
results may be due to personality scores being given relatively low 
weight and applicants attending instead to improvements on other 
tests (e.g., cognitive ability). See Randall and Villado (2017) for a 
general model of retest effects in work settings.
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one’s boss). All personality scales and performance assess-
ments in this light may be considered measures of social 
skill, although predictor and criterion labels generally do 
not reflect this as a target of measurement.
This view of personality assessment is clearly at odds 
with the more prevalent construct validity perspective. De-
ception (i.e., “faking”), according to socioanalytic theory, 
“is a conscious, deliberate deviation from typical forms 
of self-presentation, a deviation that acquaintances would 
describe as uncharacteristic behavior” (Johnson & Hogan, 
2006; p. 211). Thus, as long as one’s responses to person-
ality test items convey the reputation one earns on the job, 
faking in the construct validity sense as the deviation be-
tween one’s observed trait score and one’s true trait score 
(or honestly held true score) is entirely moot. “Faking is 
good” characterizes this perspective because covariance 
between test and performance measures due to social skill, 
regardless of accuracy in capturing real trait levels, is what 
accounts for the predictive relationship: no harm, no foul.
Self-presentation theory. Building on socioanalytic 
theory, Marcus (2009) suggests, “From the applicant’s per-
spective, attempts to manage the employer’s impressions 
can be understood as an adaptation to situational demands, 
because obtaining a job offer logically requires making a 
positive impression on the employer” (p. 418).8 Marcus 
(2006) concludes from partially simulated data that “there 
appears to be little reason to abandon the use of selection 
instruments simply because they can be faked, as long as 
there is evidence of [empirical] validity” (p. 244). Ingold, 
Kleinmann, König, and Melchers (2015) argue along the 
same lines that, “as faking was positively related to supervi-
sors’ ratings of job performance, the present results dimin-
ish concerns...about faking” (p. 430).
Marcus’ (2009) self-presentation model proposes 
two applicant skills in selection settings that boil down to 
knowing what to say (analytical skill) and knowing how 
to say it (behavioral skill). The former reflects an ability to 
identify criteria (ATIC), operationalized as the detection of 
constructs or performance metrics embedded in selection 
tools (Griffin, 2014; Kleinmann et al., 2011; Melchers et al., 
2012). High ATIC allows one to mind read by accumulat-
ing, interpreting, and correctly analyzing ambiguous social 
cues in adjusting to meet others’ expectations. Support-
ing evidence suggests ATIC (a) predicts hiring decisions 
and job performance across a variety of methods (Ingold, 
Kleinmann, König, Melchers, & Van Iddekinge, 2015; 
Kleinmann et al., 2011; König et al., 2006; Leugnerova et 
al., 2016), (b) shows consistency across assessment center 
exercises with varying performance demands (Speer et al., 
2014), and (c) mediates the effects of personality distortion 
(i.e., ideal employee factor) and performance in high- and 
low-fidelity work simulations (Klehe et al., 2012). Predic-
tions hold even after controlling for cognitive ability and 
self-monitoring, suggesting ATIC captures a unique skill in 
reading the situation as opposed to a general mental capaci-
ty or tendency to adjust to social cues (Klehe et al., 2012).
Separately from ATIC, knowing how to present oneself 
as a desirable job candidate reflects skill in communication, 
influence, presentation, and stagecraft (Marcus, 2009). Re-
search on this aspect of self-presentation in responding to 
self-report personality tests is scant. In one study, students 
high on trait emotional intelligence (EI) improved their 
odds of attaining different positions by correctly faking 
personality tests to mirror job demands (Pelt et al., 2018). 
The authors suggest trait EI captures knowledge not only 
of what is expected in varied social situations (e.g., home, 
school, work) but also of how best to respond in a given 
selection situation. In a related vein, those who faked more 
on a personality test used more interview impression man-
agement tactics and received higher supervisory ratings of 
job performance (Ingold, Kleinmann, König, & Melchers, 
2015).
Key to present aims, the self-presentation approach to 
faking, as with socioanalytic theory, evaluates validity in 
terms of the correlation between a personality scale score 
and a criterion measure and identifies nontargeted variables 
(analytic skills, behavioral skills) as legitimate assessment 
components. As long as a personality scale predicts perfor-
mance, test users need not be concerned about whether the 
personality scale captures variables serving faking, inde-
pendently of the putatively targeted trait.
Having described the FIB and FIG positions, we now 
consider their implications for the validation of self-report 
personality tests. Specifically, we show how only the FIB 
position is consistent with a unitarian understanding of con-
struct validity and that this is of fundamental importance in 
advancing personality-based selection. Psychometric and 
other challenges of faking are articulated before possible 
futures of personality assessment in selection settings are 
described based on the two perspectives.
Faking and Construct Validity
A common theme in the workplace faking literature, 
including studies in both the FIB and FIG camps but ad-
vanced more prominently in the latter, is that empirical pre-
diction is the most important aim of assessment.9 There is a 
practical allure to this position: If our goal in screening is to 
identify applicants most likely to secure high performance 
ratings, then correlation offers a mechanically efficient 
guide for making hiring decisions. The critical challenge to 
this empiricist perspective is that it fails to conform to the 
established unitarian understanding of validity, which calls 
for evidence that a given test assesses what it is purported 
to assess. Prediction offers evidence for validity in the uni-
tarian model only in light of targeted constructs and 
8    Marcus suggests faking is just one way to make a favorable im-
pression. Others include frank admissions of one’s faults and mod-
erate exaggerations of one’s strengths.
9    This generally holds for most of I-O psychology, particularly in 
more applied domains (e.g., machine learning). Faking offers a tan-
gible target for discussion but key points raised here bear general-
ization to other areas.
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their theoretical connection. Where a given scale captures 
nontargeted constructs serving faking (social skill, ATIC, 
behavioral skill)—even if those variance sources contribute 
to the correlation—faking compromises construct validity 
(Huber et al., 2021; Schilling et al., 2021; Tett & Simonet, 
2011). A test putatively targeting conscientiousness (C), 
from a strictly FIG perspective, need not assess C at all but 
rather the ability and willingness to make oneself merely 
appear well suited to the job. Faking poses a serious chal-
lenge to validation in terms of being able to judge how well 
our measures capture what they are purported to measure.
The pragmatic reader might consider this issue a the-
oretical “nicety,” a technicality reserved for esoteric, ivory 
tower, armchair rumination. After all, “assessment has a 
job to do, and the job is to predict nontest performance” 
(Hogan & Blickle, 2013; p. 57); so why should it matter 
whether our tests serve prediction via targeted traits or via a 
set of attributes underlying faking? There are several good 
reasons. The first few, described next, relate directly to vali-
dation and psychometrics.
First and foremost, faking undermines measurement of 
targeted traits and contaminates evaluation of that measure-
ment. Faking and the specific attributes serving it may be 
job relevant, but we need valid measures of C to the degree 
variance in C is meaningfully related to variance in per-
formance (e.g., as a wedding planner) beyond the possible 
relevance of the ability and willingness to fake high on the 
C scale. This is the essence of confirmatory research, based, 
for example, on personality-oriented work analysis (O’Neill 
et al., 2013). At best, traits serving faking might offer in-
cremental validity10; but, in order to test our trait-based hy-
potheses, we need to know how well the scale as a measure 
of the targeted trait predicts relevant outcomes. Faking is 
problematic even if it contributes to the trait-criterion cor-
relation.
This point bears fleshing out. The claim of socioana-
lytic theory, that people are essentially faking all the time, 
offers an unconventional explanation of correlations be-
tween personality scales and performance metrics. Those 
with high “social skill” are said to manage impressions well 
both in screening and on the job. This could mean actually 
performing well, but it might also reflect skill in explaining 
away failure, a knack of performing well only when the 
boss is looking, or otherwise managing a favorable impres-
sion that masks truly suboptimal performance. Softening 
this a bit, such or similar processes (e.g., involving ATIC) 
might account for just part of the correlation. Either way, 
if we seek to interpret the predictor–criterion correlation 
as evidence bearing on the validity of test-score inferences 
based on the targeted trait, such alternative interpretations 
pose a serious threat to those judgments. We should be very 
concerned if our prospective C measure correlates positive-
ly with wedding planning performance not because of the 
trait-based rationale but because of correlated error from 
faking and its underlying attributes operating on both sides 
of the correlation. The FIG approach acknowledges faking 
and its sources but ignores their negative impact on con-
struct validation.
Second, along related lines, faking disrupts evaluation 
of overall testing plans targeting assessment of multiple 
job-relevant constructs.11 If a personality-oriented work 
analysis identifies conscientiousness (C) as a valued trait in 
wedding planning and variance on the purported C measure 
instead captures variables serving faking, this does not di-
minish the value of C as a predictive construct. Rather, the 
trait goes unmeasured, leaving a gap in coverage of job-rel-
evant qualities. By extension, variables serving faking (e.g., 
cognitive ability; Christiansen et al., 2021; Davison et al., 
2021; Schilling et al., 2021) may be targeted more explicitly 
elsewhere in the selection battery, rendering faking variance 
ambiguously redundant. Faking thereby undermines incre-
mental prediction expected from assessment of putatively 
distinct traits. Whatever the predictive merits of faking 
might be, the value of the targeted trait goes unrealized.
Third, the FIG perspective, more so than the FIB per-
spective, promulgates the antiquated view that empirical 
relationships are sufficient for judgments of validity. The 
unitarian model makes clear that all of validity is construct 
validity. Empirical evidence supports validity only to the 
degree it is consistent with construct-based expectations. By 
accepting predictor–criterion correlation due to nontargeted 
factors serving faking as evidence of validity, the FIG ap-
proach, whether at an intuitive level (e.g., Morgeson et al., 
2007) or more theoretically grounded (e.g., Hogan & Blick-
le, 2013; Marcus, 2009), represents a throwback to the days 
where criterion validity was a “type” of validity as opposed 
to a source of construct validity evidence. Let’s unpack this 
a bit in the context of personality–performance correlations.
Effects of faking on trait-performance linkages are 
inconsistent, some studies suggesting little or no effect 
(Christiansen et al., 1994; Ones et al., 1996; Schmitt & 
Oswald, 2006), others showing attenuation due to faking 
(Anderson et al., 1984; Harold et al., 2003; Hough, 1998; 
Jeong et al., 2017; Komar et al., 2008; Peterson et al., 
2011), and still others showing positive effects (e.g., Huber 
et al., 2021; Ingold, Kleinmann, König, & Melchers, 2015; 
Ingold, Kleinmann, König, Melchers, & Van Iddekinge, 
2015; Marcus et al., 2019). Tull (1998) found that faking 
correlates positively with sales performance. As faking is 
a way of selling the self, it is reasonable to consider that 
attributes serving faking may serve performance in selling 
other things (see also Ruch & Ruch, 1967; Spiro & Weitz, 
1990). Watts et al. (2020), conversely, report null effects 
for impression management on a personality test in relation 
to retail sales. A purely empirical approach leaves us in the 
lurch as to why such inconsistencies occur. If we want to 
10   On the other hand, faking may decrease incremental validity of 
personality traits as recently found in Davison et al. (2021) wherein 
the incremental validity of conscientiousness declined when re-
spondents faked due to enhanced collinearity between conscien-
tiousness and cognitive ability.
11    We thank a reviewer for bringing this point to our attention.
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look beyond sampling error to understand those effects, we 
need to know not only what attributes underlie faking (e.g., 
McFarland & Ryan, 2006) but also the conditions affecting 
their relevance to targeted criteria (e.g., Komar et al., 2008; 
Tett & Simonet, 2011).12 
Personality scale–performance correlations emerge at 
the surface of a turbulent sea of processes (e.g., Hauenstein 
et al., 2017). Only by focusing explicitly on constructs (per 
construct validation) can an understanding of faking pro-
cesses be advanced. Where cognitive ability, ATIC, social 
skill, and other attributes possibly underlying faking (e.g., 
ambition, job knowledge) are logically tied to performance 
in particular settings, personality scales susceptible to 
faking in those respects should, all else being equal, show 
stronger linkages with performance measures. Regardless 
of any such predictive gains, however, lumping together 
targeted and nontargeted variance in touting a stronger 
correlation as evidence of “validity” ignores, if not under-
mines, the scientific value of the unitarian view. What we 
call “criterion validity” is not evidence for validity to the 
degree it is conferred by nontargeted constructs.
Fourth, extending the previous point, it matters whether 
prediction is served by a targeted trait (e.g., C in the job of 
wedding planner) or by attributes underlying faking (e.g., 
social skill) because improvements in prediction can be 
advanced programmatically only by understanding how the 
parts work independently and as a set.13 Construct valida-
tion, by promoting evaluation of a measure in terms of a 
targeted construct, is ultimately a highly practical endeavor. 
If ATIC, for example, helps explain a correlation between 
a putative measure of C and ratings of wedding planning 
performance, this suggests opportunity to develop separate 
ATIC measures in considering its relevance to performance 
in a given job. Assessing it as part of a personality scale 
targeting C severely impairs both evaluation of the role of 
C in performance from a theoretical standpoint and im-
provement of the C measure (explicitly as a measure of C) 
in light of its correlation with relevant criteria.
Fifth, nontargeted attributes serving faking can con-
found inferences regarding a scale’s internal structure. 
Items sharing susceptibility to faking (and other biases, like 
self-deception and acquiescence) will yield inflated internal 
consistency reliability above that expected based on the 
targeted attribute alone (Heggestad et al., 2006). We should 
be skeptical of scales marketed for their high reliability es-
timates to the degree their items are saturated with faking 
variance. Basically, the glue providing consistency is not 
only what the scale’s label suggests. This point extends to 
external structure as well per the ideal employee factor re-
ported by some under applicant conditions (Christiansen et 
al., 2021; Holden & Book, 2012; Huber et al., 2021; Scher-
mer et al., 2019; Schmit & Ryan, 1993; see also Bradley & 
Hauenstein, 2006). Differential susceptibility to faking im-
pedes cross-scale comparisons on key psychometric proper-
ties.
In sum, the FIG approach is problematic from a vali-
dation standpoint because it (a) uncritically accepts faking 
in confounding evaluation of trait measures based on traits 
as constructs; (b) undermines evaluation of multiconstruct 
testing plans, generating unspecified redundancies and gaps 
in coverage of job-relevant traits; (c) promulgates the an-
tiquated view that correlation is a sufficient condition for 
validity; (d) fosters continued reliance on fakable trait mea-
sures rather than directing efforts to improve assessment of 
job-relevant traits; and (e) ignores effects of faking on per-
sonality scale structure, both internal and external. Beyond 
those largely psychometric concerns, faking poses a variety 
of other challenges in selection settings.
Other Challenges of Faking
Faking opportunity is determined by one’s honestly 
held standing on a trait (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Tett & 
Simonet, 2011; Tett et al., 2012). Those with the greatest 
opportunity to fake upward on a positively valued dimen-
sion are those who honestly see themselves as falling at the 
low end of that dimension (Peterson et al., 2011). The big-
gest fakers, accordingly, are likely to be opposite those the 
organization is looking for in an ideal candidate in terms of 
personality (Tett & Christiansen, 2007). This is detrimental 
to both the organization and the applicant. Even if faking 
affords useful prediction of performance, it cannot engen-
der job satisfaction from trait-based PE fit (Charbonneau et 
al., in press); good fit accrues to the degree the individual’s 
traits help meet work demands (Christiansen et al., 2014; 
Tett et al., 2013). Faking essentially guarantees poor fit over 
time in terms of trait-based satisfaction, promising weaker 
work motivation and higher withdrawal.
The cross-situational consistency of personality, ex-
pected by most personality test users under a traditional 
trait assumption, means those willing and able to fake in 
the screening situation will be willing and able to fake on 
the job (e.g., getting away with calling in sick as a pretense 
to play golf).14 Consistent with this expectation, Peterson 
et al. (2011) found that faking on a C scale correlates pos-
itively with counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs). 
Similar results are reported by Hakstian and Ng (2005) and 
by Rosse et al. (1999). This directly supports the FIB per-
spective. It also bears consideration in terms of construct 
validity: It makes sense that faking, as a form of deviance, 
is positively related to deviant behavior on the job. By ex-
tension, fleshing out the nomological network of attributes 
12   Levashina (2018) and Tett and Christiansen (2007) explicitly con-
sider the research on the predictive merits of faking (see also Burns 
& Christiansen, 2006, regarding reliance on social desirability scales 
as faking measures). Our aims here, in contrast, are to advance the 
merits of a construct approach to validation in promoting reliance 
on personality tests as selection tools.
13   We can predict with 100% certainty that the sun will “rise” in the 
east on any given morning, but getting people to Mars and back 
requires knowing what revolves around what.
14   Roulin and Bourdage (2017) offer similar reasoning involving 
deceptive tactics in employment interviews.
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underlying faking promises more precise explication of the 
faking–CWB relationship.
Hiring fakers not only increases the risk of lower per-
formance and higher deviance, it also bumps out better 
fitting candidates from the hiring competition. Griffith et al. 
(2007) found that some successful applicants scoring high 
on a C measure scored lower on retesting 6 months post-
hire. Further analyses showed that relying on the posthire 
scores, presumed to be more honest, would have resulted in 
substantially different hiring decisions. Mueller-Hanson et 
al. (2003) and Donovan et al. (2014) report similar results. 
The loss of better fitting candidates is compounded if the 
false negatives are hired by competitors.
Regardless of its practical implications, faking is an 
affront to the golden rule. Organizations using personality 
tests for hiring are making a good faith attempt to identify 
best-fitting applicants under an implicit contract (i.e., “You 
tell us who you are and we will hire you if you fit the job”). 
Condoning faking, per the FIG approach, weakens the mor-
al foundation of that exchange. By the same token, if faking 
is acceptable, applicants should be informed that we want 
them to describe themselves, not as they see themselves 
but rather as what they think we are looking for in a good 
candidate. Otherwise, we are penalizing honesty (Griffin & 
Wilson, 2012) and compliance.
Extending the previous point, hiring fakers can be 
expected, over time, to weaken the organization’s moral 
compass.15 Hannah and Jennings (2013) discuss how eth-
ical character (“ethos”) is critical for a leader’s ability to 
influence others and how such character is nurtured by the 
shared ethics of organizational members. van Blijswijk et 
al. (2004) discuss integrity as the foundation of trust in gov-
ernment, and others have shown how ethical leaders prevent 
institutional decay by exemplifying integrity and social re-
sponsibility to inspire dedication, sacrifice, and cooperation 
to achieve greater goods (De Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2008; 
Lawton & Páez, 2015). Organizations ignoring faking face 
increased demand for ethical stewardship to offset hiring of 
workers with noncompliant and deceitful proclivities.
Two final points: Faking can promote negative reac-
tions toward personality tests, especially in more honest ap-
plicants (Honkaniemi et al., 2011), and, to the degree GMA 
underlies faking ability (Christiansen et al., 2021; Davison 
et al., 2021; Schilling et al., 2021; Tett et al., 2012), tests 
susceptible to faking are more likely to yield adverse im-
pact, increasing legal exposure.
Possible Futures for Self-Report Personality Tests as Se-
lection Tools
The foregoing discussion points to different futures 
for self-report personality assessment in the workplace de-
pending on whether one adopts a FIB or FIG perspective. 
The former, grounded in the unitarian model of construct 
validity, offers gains in the utility of personality tests 
through efforts to reduce or otherwise manage faking. The 
latter approach, which condones or promotes faking from 
an empiricist standpoint, promises a more deeply trouble-
some future. Specifically, we assert proliferation of the FIG 
perspective will lead ultimately to the demise of self-report 
personality assessment in hiring settings. This may seem 
hyperbolic, perhaps melodramatic. The stakes, however, are 
high, and what follows, in the very least, provides a frame-
work for extended didactic discourse. Let us carry forward 
first the logic of the FIG position.
The future from the FIG perspective. Earlier, we iden-
tified two key features of the FIG approach: An emphasis 
on predictive utility over construct validity and the sugges-
tion that faking and the qualities serving it (e.g., social skill, 
ATIC) may be job relevant. Here, we delve deeper into the 
FIG position as a selection paradigm by identifying three 
distinct hurdles applicants must overcome to be hired. Im-
plicit in the FIG view, successful job candidates are those 
who (a) recognize that faking is the correct strategy when 
completing a personality test as a job applicant, (b) choose 
to fake, and (c) fake well (i.e., so as to appear truly suitable 
for the job). Each step in this process offers opportunity 
for distinguishing among applicants. As with true hurdles, 
these three work only when there is variance in getting over 
them.
The first hurdle (i.e., recognizing faking as appropriate) 
works only when at least some applicants believe the test 
targets honestly held beliefs about the self. Otherwise, rec-
ognizing that faking is the correct strategy offers no com-
petitive advantage. The successful applicant, like a player 
in a social game (Johnson & Hogan, 2006; Marcus et al., 
2019), is one who sees it when others do not. The question 
then becomes, how likely is it that this hurdle will remain 
active? Something of a paradox arises in considering this 
question. As the FIG perspective takes hold, and increasing 
numbers of applicants come to see faking as the correct 
strategy in completing self-report personality tests, fewer 
and fewer traditional (honest) applicants will remain against 
whom the choice to fake is advantageous. Accordingly, in 
order to keep this hurdle operative in selection, it must be 
kept in the shadows.
Yet, as the FIG position spreads, it can only be a matter 
of time before the first hurdle is widely exposed: At some 
point, sooner or later, all applicants can be expected to 
identify faking as the appropriate strategy for personality 
test completion (Bangerter et al., 2012). How quickly this 
occurs will depend on the success of efforts to keep the 
proposed value of faking under wraps (see below). The 
challenge, then, is to defend the case for faking but without 
revealing to the majority of test takers that faking is a legit-
imate strategy to getting hired.
The second hurdle in the FIG strategy is that, once 
faking is recognized as the appropriate way to complete a 
self-report test, the applicant must choose to fake. This hur-
dle is very closely situated to the first. Even if fully aware 
15    We thank Rick Goffin for bringing this implication to our 
attention.
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that faking is the norm and that fakers tend to get hired, an 
applicant might nonetheless choose not to fake. One such 
individual would be someone who perceives their actual 
traits to be well aligned with job demands, eliminating 
not only the need to fake but also the opportunity to do 
so (Tett & Simonet, 2011; Tett et al., 2012). Those who 
perceive their actual trait levels are not so well aligned: 
however, who still choose not to fake, despite being fully 
aware of pro-faking norms and outcomes, are likely to be 
in a very small minority. The reasons are obvious. People 
apply for jobs because they seek employment. Avoiding 
faking under the specified conditions would be a deliberate 
act of self-sabotage, akin to intentionally arriving late and 
unkempt for a job interview or purposely insulting the in-
terviewer. Such people are out there, to be sure; but serious 
applicants in the normal range of functioning can be ex-
pected to be sensitive to norms, especially when the stakes 
are high, as in employment situations. Thus, to the degree 
faking is widely acknowledged to be a viable test-taking 
strategy in screening, it is reasonable to assume the large 
majority of applicants will choose to fake if they judge their 
trait levels unfit for the job. Accordingly, the second hurdle 
offering a means to distinguish among job applicants in the 
FIG model falls pretty much in unison with the unveiling 
of the first hurdle, making faking a widely accepted and es-
sentially universal practice.
Note that the story has unfolded to this point without 
engaging ethical and other initiatives raised above. For 
example, the hiring organization might, for the sake of fair-
ness, choose to inform all applicants that faking is not only 
expected but also required of candidates. This directive 
could also be justified in seeking more homogeneous and 
interpretable data. Regardless of how the first two hurdles 
are removed, the FIG perspective, we suggest, leads inev-
itably to their removal. This leaves only the third hurdle, 
which is knowing how to respond to personality test items 
so as to make oneself appear most suited to the given job.
There is general consensus that faking well (as opposed 
to faking per se) is a cognitively demanding task (Chris-
tiansen et al., 2021; Davison et al., 2021; Levashina et al., 
2009; Schilling et al., 2021; Vasilopoulos & Cucina, 2006). 
Not all who fake do so in a way that improves their chances 
of being hired. Some fail to recognize job-relevant items, 
others choose the wrong end of the response continuum 
(e.g., agree/disagree), still others fake consistently to one 
extreme or the other, failing to appreciate that, at least for 
some traits (and/or items), the ideal score is in the middle 
of the scale. Applicants able to successfully navigate the 
test landscape to present themselves as high-fit candidates 
demonstrate at least a working understanding of the job and 
how specific items relate to key job demands (e.g., ATIC). 
The FIG logic on this point seems tight enough: Hiring 
high-scoring fakers promises to be effective because people 
who know the job and what it takes to be good at it can 
generally be expected to perform that job well. But let’s ex-
amine that assumption a little more closely.
What does it take to know a job and answer job-rele-
vant items correctly? Experience helps, especially in similar 
jobs. General cognitive ability aids in both the retention 
and retrieval of job-related experience, and it should help 
further with identifying job-relevant items and response 
options. Consistent with this, Schilling et al. (2021) report 
meta-analytic mean correlations between cognitive ability 
and personality test scores that are stronger in selection set-
tings (mean rho = .11 to .26) than in nonselection settings 
(.00 to .16). Similarly, Christiansen et al. (2021) found cog-
nitive ability to account for both a mean shift in personality 
scores and a stronger general personality factor, indicative 
of faking, in applicants compared to incumbents. Interest 
in the job might also serve faking, to the degree schema are 
better developed on topics we find interesting (Ackerman, 
1996). Social skill and ATIC, as noted above, may be key 
sources of successful faking. Knowing the job by way of 
experience, general ability, and interest is clearly relevant 
to job performance, and social skill and ATIC are further 
relevant to most if not all jobs. All this is well within the 
comfort zone of those pursuing a FIG strategy. Two import-
ant caveats, however, bear consideration.
The first caveat is that job knowledge (however 
achieved) is far more directly assessable by way of a test 
explicitly developed to assess that knowledge (e.g., using 
a situational judgment test) than indirectly by way of a 
personality test. Similarly, job experience, general ability, 
and work interests permit more direct, unambiguous, and 
logically defensible assessment than by way of a personal-
ity test. ATIC and social skill also seem likely to be better 
assessed if explicitly targeted at the outset of scale devel-
opment (e.g., as emotional intelligence, Pelt et al., 2018; or 
self-presentation skill, Marcus et al., 2019). Here is the key 
point: If the KSAs tied to successful faking on a personal-
ity test become the true targets of measurement, then why 
bother with personality testing at all? Why not “cut out the 
middle man” and go more directly to the sources of faking 
variance judged to be job relevant?
The second caveat is that, by implicitly (or even explic-
itly) targeting job knowledge, experience, ability, interest, 
social skill, and/or ATIC, we do not really have a person-
ality test at all but rather a messy compound scale that is 
simply mislabeled as a “personality test.” This has serious 
implications for construct validity, as noted above, but it 
also points directly to the demise of self-report personality 
testing in the normal sense of that term.
Putting all this together, a reasonable expectation car-
rying forward the FIG argument—that faking is a good 
way to distinguish good from poor workers or, in its weak-
er variant, does not matter—is that personality tests are 
doomed for extinction as selection tools. If faking is desir-
able or condoned, then eventually all applicants will realize 
this and all but a few with unsuitable traits will choose to 
fake for both normative and practically competitive rea-
sons. When they do, those who fake well will be hired, but 
the same KSAs serving successful faking (prior work ex-
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perience, g, interests, social skill, ATIC) are better assessed 
more directly without traditional self-report personality 
tests. If we continue to rely on those tests regardless (be-
cause they correlate with performance), they are by that 
point not assessing personality traits.
Other reasons, noted earlier, dig the grave deeper: 
The biggest fakers are opposite those at the desirable end 
of job-relevant traits; good fakers can be expected to be 
effective deceivers on the job, so hiring them is risky both 
in the short term (e.g., increased CWBs) and over time in 
undermining the organization’s moral compass; satisfac-
tion-based fit, conferred by having personality traits that 
truly match key work demands, can be expected to be poor. 
In light of all those issues, organizations will understand-
ably switch to devices that are harder to fake (Bangerter et 
al., 2012), seeking to invest their selection dollars in tools 
promising higher returns.
The doom-and-gloom future of the FIG strategy con-
trasts with possible futures afforded by the more traditional 
FIB perspective but only conditionally. It is to those futures 
that we now turn.
The future from the FIB perspective. Relative to the 
FIG path, the way forward from a FIB perspective is less 
certain. One possibility is that faking may prove too strong 
to be contained: too easy to do and too hard to control 
(especially given justifications promulgated by the FIG 
position). If so, the end may be the same as that befalling 
the FIG perspective, but the trail is different. Rather than 
having key hurdles rendered inert and personality tests re-
placed by other measures more explicitly targeting job-rel-
evant faking attributes, death by faking occurs in the FIB 
camp from contamination of construct-driven, trait-relevant 
variance by unwanted error variance with differential job 
relevance. In short, FIG leads to the demise of self-report 
personality tests by the loss of variance producers (i.e., the 
three noted hurdles), whereas failing to limit faking, ac-
cording to the FIB view, threatens personality assessment 
by measurement contamination.
Alternatively, the FIB view also offers a more prom-
ising path forward, one supporting personality test use in 
hiring afforded in part by success in identifying and con-
trolling faking as an unwanted source of variance. This 
more optimistic possibility is that self-report tests can be 
developed that are relatively immune to faking, whether by 
careful wording to avoid reliance on especially value-laden 
terms, by instructions designed to promote truthful self-de-
scription (e.g., reasonable threats of faking detection), by 
forcing respondents to choose between self-descriptions 
paired on desirability, by inclusion of impossible virtues 
(e.g., being skilled in fictitious domains), by situating items 
in explicitly work-related settings (i.e., “at work”), and sim-
ilar means. Research streams exist on each of those fronts, 
offering promise along those lines (see Levashina, 2018; 
Tett et al., 2006).
Further on the plus side, the FIB perspective is not 
at odds with the appropriateness of faking as a source of 
variance (i.e., hurdle 1). Rather, everything is pretty much 
out in the open. Applicants are explicitly discouraged from 
faking. Fairness is a goal of assessment for ethical as well 
as practical reasons, tied to both applicant reactions (level 
playing field) and decision validity (unbiased decisions). 
The constructs actually targeted for assessment are those for 
which the scales are labeled (e.g., a “C” test targets C, not 
the ability and willingness to fake high on C), and construct 
validity remains the gold standard of psychometric quality, 
as it is in most domains of psychological inquiry.
Perhaps an overly idealistic prospect coming out of 
the FIB approach is that applicants might more universal-
ly come to realize that faking is ultimately self-defeating 
in that it promotes a poor fit to the job from a personality 
standpoint (Charbonneau et al., in press). A good-fitting job 
is one offering opportunities at multiple levels (e.g., task, 
group, and organization) for workers to express themselves 
in ways that are positively valued by the organization (Tett 
& Burnett, 2003; Tett et al., 2013). Weighing against this 
ideal is the fact that people are generally motivated to gain 
employment and associated rewards in the form of pay, 
benefits, and status. Putting a roof over one’s head, food 
on the table, and extra money in one’s pocket typically su-
persede the pleasantries of a comfortable personality-based 
fit at work. For able applicants, however, especially in a 
strong economy where jobs are plentiful, a reasonable goal 
should be to land a job that is especially well suited to one’s 
particular traits. In such times of plenty, faking promises 
more pain than gain to the applicant in terms of fit. Indeed, 
Charbonneau et al. (in press) report deceptive impression 
management in job interviews is negatively related to per-
ceived fit at the job and organization levels. Advocates of 
the construct approach to personality assessment might ac-
cordingly help applicants and hiring organizations achieve 
a better fit by promoting honest and accurate self-reporting 
of job-relevant personality traits.
Summary and Conclusions
Personality has much to offer as a basis for hiring good-
fit workers. The traditional logic, tracing back to the origins 
of personality testing, is that (a) people differ in stable pro-
pensities to behave (i.e., traits), (b) some traits are meaning-
fully and reliably linked to performance in a given job, and 
(c) self-report offers a convenient, albeit imperfect, way to 
assess individual differences in job-relevant traits. Thus, 
(d) hiring those scoring high on positively valued, job-rele-
vant traits is expected to increase mean performance levels, 
worker satisfaction, and organizational success.
Faking is a problem in the traditional model because it 
threatens the third part of the logic: High scores can indi-
cate either high standing on a job-relevant trait or the ability 
and willingness to make oneself merely appear to have that 
high standing. Distinguishing those two cases is the crux of 
the faking problem in selection settings. In contrast to the 
FIG perspective, which discounts faking in pursuit of raw 
predictive power, the FIB approach seeks to minimize it as 
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a threat to construct validity, thereby improving personali-
ty-based selection.
The demise of personality assessment by either route 
is far from certain, but we see it as a very real possibility 
should applicants reach a tipping point in the proportion 
who fake. Experimental work on social change shows 
adoption of a new norm by only 25% of group members 
can spark an abrupt shift in prevailing practice (Centola et 
al., 2018). Organizational estimates of faking prevalence 
of around 14% in the 1960s (Dunnette et al., 1962) have 
grown to 30% and even 62% more recently (Donovan et 
al., 2003; Griffith et al., 2007; see Levashina, 2018). To 
the extent this corresponds to increasing beliefs that faking 
is common, favorable, and doable, a rise in actual faking 
behavior seems likely (McFarland & Ryan, 2006), promot-
ing an arms race pitting applicant self-presentation tactics 
against organizational needs for valid signals (Bangerter et 
al., 2012). Such increases in faking are troubling as com-
pleting self-report measures is susceptible to coaching (Al-
liger & Dwight, 2000), and simulations show it takes only 
30% of applicants who fake to a larger degree (1.5 theta 
shift) to severely compromise the construct validity of per-
sonality tests (Lee et al., 2019).
Supporting our concern is recent direct evidence that 
personality tests are less predictive of performance when 
based on applicant samples, where the motivation to fake 
is heightened. Jeong et al. (2017) compared personality–
performance correlations for incumbents versus hired ap-
plicants in four samples. In all four cases, linkages were 
weaker for applicants (mean = .08, range = .01 to .19) than 
for incumbents (mean = .28, range = .23 to .44). The overall 
weakness of the applicant-based results undermines expec-
tations of empirical gains from faking. Published validation 
studies using applicants are relatively rare, and more such 
studies are needed going forward. It is reasonable to ask, 
however, whether we are currently witnessing the fall of 
personality assessment for use in hiring, as discussed above.
The trends, if true, suggest the need for action. In light 
of the arguments presented here, we urge researchers and 
those relying on standardized personality tests for personnel 
selection to weigh carefully the implications of allowing 
faking and its underlying attributes to contaminate targeted 
trait variance, to resist the lure of a correlation strengthened 
by nontargeted constructs, and to seek improvements in 
personality assessment through application of the unitarian 
understanding of validity. In particular, there is an ongoing 
need to develop more faking-resistant self-report measures 
whether regarding item format (e.g., forced choice), re-
sponse instructions (e.g., warnings) or, otherwise, improve-
ments in faking detection methods.
Along related lines, we urge personality test publishers 
to more routinely validate their predictive inferences based 
on applicants (Jeong et al., 2017) and urge organizations to 
weigh such evidence in judging whether or not to use a per-
sonality test in hiring. We further recommend that organiza-
tions using personality tests in hiring should emphasize to 
applicants the value of honest responding and compliance 
with good-faith efforts to achieve a good fit with the work 
setting. Adopting a FIG perspective threatens to delegiti-
mize personality assessment in selection efforts. Constructs 
and the accuracy of their assessment matter, and whatever 
may be good about applicant faking is bad for personnel 
selection based on job-relevant personality traits.
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